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Abstract. In this paper we study the effect of inflexible individuals with
fixed opinions, or zealots, on the dynamics of the best-of-n collective de-
cision making problem, using both the voter model and the majority
rule decision mechanisms. We consider two options with different qual-
ities, where the lower quality option is associated to a higher number
of zealots. The aim is to study the trade-off between option quality and
zealot quantity for two different scenarios: one in which all agents can
modulate dissemination of their current opinion proportionally to the
option quality, and one in which this capability is only possessed by the
zealots. In both scenarios, our goal is to determine in which conditions
consensus is more biased towards the high or low quality option, and
to determine the indifference curve separating these two regimes. Using
both numerical simulations and ordinary differential equation models,
we find that: i) if all agents can modulate the dissemination time based
on the option quality, then consensus can be driven to the high quality
option when the number of zealots for the other option is not too high; ii)
if only zealots can modulate the dissemination time based on the option
quality, while all normal agents cannot distinguish the two options and
cannot differentially disseminate, then consensus no longer depends on
the quality and is driven to the low quality option by the zealots.
1 Introduction
Collective decision making is a process whereby a population of agents makes a
collective decision based only on local perception and communication. Originally
inspired by the behavior of social insects [4, 2], collective decision making is con-
sidered an important problem connected to more elaborated collective behaviors
in swarms robotics [28], such as site selection or collective motion [3].
The best-of-n problem [28] is a special case where agents have to chose the
best option among n possible alternatives with potentially different qualities.
The option quality may be known to swarm members [29], or may need to be
discovered [23, 25, 24]. An option can be considered best because it minimizes the
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cost required to be evaluated or because its intrinsic quality is the highest [28].
In the latter case, a method to achieve the optimal collective decision is to let
each agent advertise an option for a duration that is proportional to its quality,
a mechanism called “modulation of positive feedback” [8, 30, 29].
In this paper we focus on the best-of-n problem with n = 2 options in presence
of stubborn individuals, henceforth called zealots. Zealots are individuals that
have a fixed opinion that never changes. We introduce differential option quality
and differential zealot quantity in an antagonistic setting: the two options are
associated to different values of quality and zealot quantities; and the number of
zealots is higher for the option that has a lower quantity, hence it is not obvious
which option will prevail. Two specific cases are compared: i) all agents are able
to measure the quality of the two options and disseminate for a time proportional
to the quality; ii) only zealots and not the normal agents are able to measure
the quality of the different options, and disseminate for a time proportional to
the quality of their opinion, while normal agents disseminate for a time that
is independent from the quality. This last scenario is referring for example to
the case where, in a swarm of robots used for monitoring task, only some of
them (zealots) have additional sensors and they can perceive the quality of the
two options. In this case, the number of zealots can be a design parameter or a
constraint depending on the problem: fully equipped robots with many sensors
are more expensive due to a larger payload.
Using computer simulations and ordinary differential equations (ODEs) mod-
els, we ask the following question: Is the swarm consensus state more biased
towards the option represented by more zealots or the one represented by the
highest quality? We are particularly interested in identifying the “indifference
curve” separating the two regions identified by the consensus state being more
biased towards one or the other option. We investigate whether the indifference
curve behaves differently across two scenarios. Finally, we determine whether
these results are affected by two decision mechanisms: the voter models, whereby
agents change their opinion copying the opinion of a random neighbor, and the
majority model where instead agents adopt the opinion of the local majority.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
the state of art. In Section 3, we describe the collective decision-making model
utilized in this study. In Section 4 we discuss the results obtained. In Section 5,
we conclude the paper and discuss future developments.
2 State of the Art
The best-of-n problem is inspired by biological studies of swarms of ants and
bees [9, 15, 26]. As extensively discussed in [28], the quality and cost of the options
can further characterize the nature of the best-of-n decision-making problem. In
the current paper, quality and not cost is the main factor driving consensus.
Another important element that bears upon the decision-making dynamics
is the presence of zealots within the swarm. The influence of zealots has been
abundantly studied in physics, but introduced within swarms only recently. In
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the following, we will first review the few contributions focusing on zealots within
swarms, and then review some of the work done within physics.
In the context of swarms, a recent study [21] illustrated the impact of zealots
in the context of dynamic environments, where the option qualities can drasti-
cally change over time. Here, the presence of a small number of zealots enables
the swarm to always select the option with the best quality even after abrupt
changes, while without zealots, the swarm is not able to adapt and the consensus
remains frozen. The authors in [5] introduced three types of malicious agents that
can affect resilience of a swarm: contrarians, wishy-washy, and zealots. They per-
formed a preliminary study on their effect on the best-of-n with four mechanisms:
voter, majority, cross inhibition, and k-unanimity (q-voter). In [22], the authors
also looked at the effects of malicious adversarial zealots in a data communi-
cation manipulation scenario, proposing a probabilistic decision-making rule to
increase resilience. A very recent extension has been applied and evaluated the
same scheme to a simulated swarm robotics scenario [14].
In the context of physics, the author in [6] introduced zealots in a model of
pairwise social influence for opinion dynamics, and showed a rich phase diagram
of the possible dynamics when only a small percentage of zealots is present.
In the context of Internet social networks, the best placement of zealots that
maximizes the impact on the consensus dynamics of the population is studied in
[13]. The study shows that a small number of zealots can significantly influence
the overall opinion dynamics and induce the entire population to reach a large
consensus over disputed issues, such as Brexit. In [17], the authors studied the
role of zealots in a social system using the naming game as decision mechanism.
They show that even a very small minority can drive the opinion of a large
population, if committed agents are more active than the others. However, this
effect can be hindered if nodes with the same opinion are more connected with
each other than with nodes with different opinion, producing a polarization inside
the network.
The authors of [11, 18] studied the impact of zealots in a social network,
considering different degrees of zealotry. The focus of [11] is studying the effect
of zealotry on the convergence time of the system. In [18], despite having used
the majority rule instead than the voter, the authors were able to find similar
results as in [21, 7], in which introducing equal number of zealots on both option
sides prevents the network from reaching a consensus state. Similarly, in [32],
the presence of zealots is proven to prevent the formation of consensus, intro-
ducing instabilities and fluctuations in a binary voter model of a small-world
network. A recent study illustrated in [1] aimed at studying the influence of
zealots on “politically polarized” state vs consensus state and found that higher
“influence of zealots” produces more polarization, shorter time to polarization,
and conversely less consensus and longer to impossible time to consensus.
In [31], the authors showed the presence of a tipping point at which a minority
of zealots is able to swing the initial majority opinion in a network. The study
described in [16] focused on zealots with the voter model to perform peer-to-
peer opinion influence, however differently from our work zealots were nodes of
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a) b)
Fig. 1: (a) Probabilistic finite state machine. States represent dissemination and
exploration states. Solid lines denote deterministic transitions, while dotted lines
stochastic transitions. The symbol VM indicates the model (Voter/Majority)
used at the end of the dissemination state. (b) The simulation arena.
a complex network. In [10], a scenario with zealots with the majority rule was
studied. The outcome of the system was spontaneous symmetry breaking when
zealot numbers were symmetrical for the two options, while consensus towards
one option emerged even with minimal unbalance in the number of zealots. In
these studies options did not have an intrinsic quality.
To summarize, zealotry has been abundantly studied in physics, typically
in fixed interaction topologies, and only recently introduced in the context of
swarms, in dynamic local interaction topologies. Compared to the latest work in
swarms [21, 5, 22, 14], to the best of our knowledge, in this paper we study for
the first time the interplay between different option quality and different zealot
quantity, by extending the preliminary study in [19], in which the voter model
only was considered and all the agents were able to disseminate differentially
with quality.
3 The Model
In the best-of-n problem, a swarm of agents has to reach a collective decision
among n possible alternatives. In this paper, the n = 2 opinions considered are
labelled A and B and have intrinsic quality values ρA and ρB . The best collective
decision is made if consensus is for the option with highest quality: formally, a
large majority M ≤ N(1 − δ) of agents agrees on the same option, where δ
is a small number chosen by the experimenter. δ = 0 corresponds to perfect
consensus. Variants of the best-of-n are: the two options may have differential
access times or costs [28], option quality may change over time [21, 19], or the
swarm may have a heterogeneous nature [21]. In the latter, a special case consists
in the swarm composed by two different types of agents: zealots, agents with a
fixed unchangeable opinion A or B; and normal agents, initialized with opinion
A or B, but able to change their opinion by applying a decision mechanism that
relies on the observation of other agents in local proximity.
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Table 1: Model parameters used in simulations
Parameter Description Values
N swarm size {100, 1000}
ρA site A quality 1
ρB site B quality {1, 1.05, 1.10, .., 2}
σB proportion of zealots with opinion B to N {0, 0.0125, 0.025, 0.05}
σA proportion of zealots with opinion A to N {0, 0.05, ..0.5}
3.1 The Simulation Model
Similarly to [20], the behaviour of the agents is controlled by the probabilistic
finite state machine (FSM) shown in Figure 1a. The FSM has four possible
states: dissemination state of opinion A (DA), dissemination state of opinion B
(DB), exploration state of opinion A (EA), and exploration state of opinion B
(EB). Agents are located in a rectangular arena divided in a central part called
the nest and lateral (left and right) parts called the sites, each associated to A
or B, respectively (see Figure 1b). All agents are initialized inside the nest, and
move toward the site associated with their opinion to explore that option, for
an exponentially distributed amount of time (sampled independently per agent)
with mean time q, independent of the current opinion. After exploration, agents
have measured the site quality and travel back to the nest after having switched
to the dissemination state associated with their current opinion (DA if they were
in EA, DB if they were in EB).
In the dissemination state at the nest, to meet the well-mixed criterion as
much as possible [12], agents perform a correlated random walk. Each agent lo-
cally broadcasts his opinion continuously, and this message is sensed by other
agents in local proximity that are in the process of applying the decision mecha-
nism (before transitioning back to the exploration state). The time spent by the
agent disseminating its opinion is exponentially distributed with mean propor-
tional to the site quality they have last visited g ·ρi, i ∈ {a, b}. We considered two
different cases in this paper. In the first, both normal agents and zealots with
opinion A disseminate proportional to ρA, and both normal agents and zealots
with opinion B disseminate proportional to ρB . In the second case, only zealots
disseminate proportional to quality (ρA or ρB), while normal agents disseminate
independently from the quality proportionally to ρ = 1. This second case is novel
in this paper and was introduced to determine whether modulation of positive
feedback is effective through zealots only.
At the end of dissemination, normal agents and zealots behave in two different
ways. Normal agents can change their opinion based on the opinions of other
agents within a specified spatial radius (in our simulations set to 10 units). The
voter model or the majority rule is applied: In the case of voter model, the agent
switches its opinion to the one of a random neighbors within the interaction
radius [30]; while in majority rule, the agent switches its opinion to the one of
the majority of its neighbors (G = 2 neighbors [29]).
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3.2 ODEs Model
We adapted the model proposed in [21] which extends the ones in [30, 29]. The
variables eA, eB , dA, dB model the sub-population of agents exploring site A,
exploring site B, disseminating in the nest opinion A and disseminating in the
nest opinion B, respectively. The variables modeling sub-populations of zealots
are constant. They are denoted with eAS , eBS , dAS , dBS . The total proportion
of agents with opinion A and B are respectively xA = eA + dA + eAS + dAS and
xB = eB+dB+eBS+dBS . The total number of agents is conserved xA+xB = 1.



























































Equations on the left column describe the dynamics of normal agents, while
equations on the right column describe the dynamics of zealots. In Equation 1-
left, the proportion of agents disseminating opinion A increases because of agents
returning from the exploration of A at rate 1q , and decreases because of agents
terminating dissemination at rate 1ρANg . Similarly, equation 2-left describe the
rate of increase of the number of agents disseminating opinion B. In Equation
3-left the number of agents exploring site A decreases because of agents finishing
exploration at rate 1q , and increases because of two contributions: i) agents that
had previously opinion A and kept the same opinion after the application of the
voter/majority model and ii) agents that had previously opinion B but switch
to A as a result of the voter/majority model. Similarly, Equation 4-left describes
how agents exploring site B vary. The rates pAA, pAB , pBA, and pBB describe the
probabilistic outcome of the two decision mechanisms and are described next.
Note that qualities in the left column equations are indicated with ρAN and ρBN
as placeholders. These correspond to the site qualities ρAN = ρA, ρBN = ρB
when all agents disseminate differentially, while ρAN = ρBN = ρ = 1 when only
zealots disseminate differentially. The dynamic of zealots is described in a very
similar way by the equations on the right column. The only difference consists in
the impossibility that a zealot to change its opinion after any interaction, thus
the terms that depend on the decision mechanisms are omitted. For the zealot
case, the dissemination always takes place proportional to ρA and ρB .
Regarding the decision mechanism, for the voter model the probability that
the outcome of the decision is A (resp. B) is the probability that, when observing
a random agent disseminating, that random agent is disseminating A (resp.
B). This is given by the ratio of agents disseminating A with respect to the
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Fig. 2: Consensus heatmaps for the voter model in simulations (first row) and
with ODEs (second row), for all agents performing differential dissemination (a
and c) and for only performing differential dissemination (b and d). In all cases
σB = 0.0125, and N = 1000 in the simulations. The colour scale represents the
consensus for A. Dark blue colors indicate perfect consensus to the best opinion
B, dark red colors indicate perfect consensus to the worst opinion, A, while the
white color shows the indifference curve (consensus state around 0.5).








For the majority model, where each agent switches its opinion to the one
hold by the majority of its G neighbors, the two probabilities are simply given
by the cumulative sum of probabilities distributed according to a hypergeo-
metric distribution modeling how many neighbors have each of the two opin-













The experiments were conducted using a simulation tool originally developed by
[30]. The simulated arena is a rectangular, two-dimensional space. The collision
of the agents is not modeled, however, previous results show that real robot
experiments could be accurately reproduced [27].
In each experiment, σA (resp. σB) is the proportion of zealots committed
to A (resp. B). In every run, we first initialize the zealots according to σA
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a) b)
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Fig. 3: Consensus heatmap obtained from ODE solution of majority model (σB =
0.0125). Two cases are considered: all agents disseminate for a time proportional
to the quality of the option (Panel a and b) or only zealots disseminate for a
time proportional to the quality of the option (Panel c and d). The colour scale
represents NA/N . Blue cells indicate perfect consensus (agreement to the best
opinion, B). Red cells mean consensus to the worst opinion, A. Tiled cells in (b)
and (d) indicate the lack of a second stable equilibrium.
and σB . Afterwards, we set 50% of the remaining (normal) agents to opinion
A and the remaining (normal) agents to opinion B. We fix N = 1000 agents
and σB = 0.0125, as preliminary [19] as well as current study shows that these
parameters do not affect the results. The nest size to 316 × 316 and two sites
have the same size of the nest. As zealots need to be more numerous for the
option with the lower quality, we set σA ≥ σB and ρA ≤ ρB . Table 1 reports all
parameter values.
4.1 Results with the Voter Model
In Fig.2, we report the heatmaps obtained from simulations and ODE corre-
sponding to the two cases where all the agents disseminate proportionally to the
quality (panels a and c) and where only zealots disseminate proportionally to the
quality (panels b and d). The simulations results (panels a and b) are reproduced
very well by the ODE predictions (c and d, respectively). When all the agents are
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aware or can measure the qualities of the two options, the consensus to the best
option B, represented in blue color, can still be reached despite the increasing
number of zealots of the opposite opinion. Only for very high number of zealots
(larger than 30% of the total agents), consensus is driven to the worst option A.
The indifference curve here is diagonal and depends on both parameters ρB and
σA. The quality of the best option B has a predominant effect with respect to
the quantity of zealots for the worst option A.
On the contrary, if only zealots can measure the quality and disseminate
differentially, consensus is never driven to the best option B, except for the case
where the number of zealots of the worst option is the same or less than the
number of zealots of the best option. In other words, the indifference curve is in
this case vertical and only depends on the parameter σA.
4.2 Results with the Majority Rule
Given the very good results obtained from ODE that accurately reproduce the
multi-agents simulations, we used ODEs to study how the system behaves when
using the majority rule as decision mechanism. These are shown in Fig.3. Pan-
els a and b show the case where all agents are disseminating proportionally to
the quality, while panels c and d show the case where only zealots are dissemi-
nating proportionally to the quality. Fig.3 reports only the stable equilibria. In
both cases, two different regimes can be observed. For every value σA, a stable
equilibria appears (left panels), while a second stable equilibrium exists only
for low values of σA (right panels). This additional stable equilibrium for the
worst option A can be explained by the faster and less accurate dynamics of the
majority rule [29]. Looking to the first stable equilibirium (left panels), results
are similar to those of voter model: If all agents disseminate differentially, we
observe a dependency on ρB , while if only zealots disseminate differentially the
results depend only on σA. However, compared to voter decision mechanism,
the majority rule seems more resilient to the quantity of zealots A: When all
agents disseminate differentially, the system is more resilient to σA for lower
values of ρB , while for higher values of ρB the voter and the majority behave
in a similar way; additionally, also when only zealots disseminate differentially
the system can converge to the best option for higher values of σA using the
majority compared to the voter.
We also visualize the bifurcation diagram (Fig. 4) for the case where all
agents disseminate proportionally to the quality (left column) and the case where
zealots only disseminate proportionally to the quality (right column). Every
row represents a different value of ρB = 1, 1.5, 2 respectively. The consensus
state for A, denoted by xA, is studied for increasing σA. Here, we confirm the
presence of two stable equilibria for low values of σA. At some point, a saddle-
node bifurcation occurs, and only one stable equilibrium survives. However, we
observe that the position of the saddle-node bifurcation moves to the right with
respect to σA only for the case where all agents disseminate differentially, and not
for the case where only zealots do so. We believe these dynamics are interesting
because this potentially means that the system is irreversible: if initially the




Fig. 4: Bifurcation diagram for majority model with all agents disseminating dif-
ferentially (left column) and with only zealots disseminating differentially (right
column) for different values of ρB : ρB = 1 (first row), ρB = 1.5 (second row),
ρB = 2 (third row). σB = 0.0125 in all plots. Stable equilibria are represented
by a continuous line, while unstable equilibria are represented by a dashed line
and indicated with an .̂
number of zealots A is low, consensus will very likely be for B. However, if σA
increases, consensus will abruptly change to A after the bifurcation. From that
point onwards, reducing again σA will not recover consensus to B but the system
will be locked in the A consensus state even for progressively lower and lower
values of σA.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper the well established model of best-of-n model is investigated by
focusing on the interplay between zealots and quality. We focus on the antago-
nistic scenario in which the number of zealots is higher for the option that has
the lowest quality. Two specific cases are considered: i) both normal agents and
zealots can measure the quality of the two options; ii) only zealots can measure
the quality of the two options.
The main findings of this paper are: i) if both zealots and normal agents have
a different dissemination time determined by the quality of their opinion, the
quality has the capability to drive the consensus to the best option, provided
that the number of stubborn of the worst opinion is not too high; ii) if only
zealots disseminate for a time proportional to the quality of their opinion, the
consensus is driven only by the number of zealots. In this case, the quality never
prevails and the consensus is to the option with higher number of zealots. From
a social perspective, these results show that if only an élite knows how good dif-
ferent alternatives are, or have means to measure this information, the consensus
cannot be driven to the better quality if the number of zealots supporting the
worse quality is higher than the number of zealots supporting the best quality.
This means that zealots can be explicitly designed to manipulate the opinion of
the population. On the contrary, it is of paramount importance, at least in our
models, that the whole population has the means to assess the quality of the
alternatives, because this is the only way to be resilient, up to a given extent, to
zealot manipulations and to achieve the best social good.
In the future, we would like to further analyze the dynamics, especially those
with the majority model that manifested interesting irreversible dynamics. We
would like to relate this model with others such as those based on cross in-
hibition [25]. Additionally, from the engineering perspective, we would like to
understand whether it is possible to design a resilient mechanism for the normal
individuals to be resilient to zealots even when they cannot measure the quality,
in order to revert the results obtained with zealot-only differential dissemination.
These can be useful in swarm robotics applications whereby sensors necessary
to estimate quality are expensive and can only be produced for a minority of the
individuals.
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Andreagiovanni Reina and Gabriele
Valentini for the useful discussions on the theoretical models and the latter for
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